Credit Crisis problem identification crisis?

Could the credit crisis not be about liquidity, instead about something even scarier, like exposure to risk? Telos reports:

“Since the month of August, economists have been trying to understand why something that was supposed to be positive for global growth, namely the diversification of risk through securitization, had turned out to be the source of the recent crisis. The first reaction was to characterize this as a liquidity crisis…. More than a month, and many billions of dollars of extra liquidity injections, later the situation in money and credit markets has not improved. Central banks have added liquidity to a situation of already “excess liquidity” to tackle an apparent liquidity crunch, and yet nothing has got better. Perhaps it was not about liquidity, after all.

What we are experiencing is a combination of reduction in the value of global collateral, deleveraging, reintermediation, and risk aversion.”

To me, this is very scary and raises the idea that maybe the underlying theory behind practices such as securitisation, to be perfectly blunt, are majorly flawed as a growth mechanism. When loans get repackaged, bundled and sold off as AAA credit ratings, it’s not unlike a manufacturer selling a flawed product inside some very pretty packaging. These tactics in the consumer world aren’t as huge a crime, because eventually consumers figure out the products are not as advertised, but flawed, and simply ‘bad value’. But what if every consumer took it as gospel that each boxed good was exactly what the box said: a low risk, high quality mechanism, and no one ever questioned it? Then you’ve got some problems. Liquidity is still the problem, but that’s in the medium term. In the short term, risk is the true
problem.